


















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2805 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









This paper examines whether the federal structure of aid-receiving countries matters in 
explaining aid effectiveness. Following the decentralization theorem, the devolution of 
powers should increase aid effectiveness, since local decision-makers are better informed 
about local needs. At the same time, decentralization has reverse effects, e.g., through 
coordination problems, excessive regulation, administrative costs and local capture. Using 
panel data for up to 60 countries, we find that aid is less effective or even harmful in 
decentralized countries. Our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how 
both anti-poverty instruments - financial assistance and decentralization - work together. 
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The majority of developing countries depend heavily on external resources. In some of the poorest
countries, such as Timor-Leste or the Democratic Republic of Congo, the share of development
aid in gross national income is above 50% [Worldbank (2006)]. Since 1960, member countries of
the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have spent almost 2 trillion US dollars of
ocial development assistance (ODA). In recent years, ODA amounts to roughly 100 billion US
dollars per year.
In light of these enormous gures, there has been an increasing interest in the eciency of foreign
aid. The question is whether aid promotes economic development, or whether aid has undesirable
side eects making it ineective. In the past 30 years, a large number of studies investigating
the aid-growth nexus have been published. Despite the enormous eort researchers have invested
in this issue, there is still no consensus. Since the literature presents a mixed picture of a direct
impact of aid on growth, numerous studies have begun to focus on the conditions under which aid
is eective. One issue that has been neglected in this literature is the role of the federal structure
of aid-receiving countries. This is quite surprising, as national and supranational development
agencies consider the devolution of powers as major part of their anti-poverty programs. For
example, 12% of World Bank projects completed between 1993 and 1997 involved decentralizing
responsibilities to lower levels of government [Litvack et al. (1998)]. In 2006, more than 19%,
or 4.5 billion dollars, of the World Bank budget was spent on projects involving decentralization
[Development Committee (2006)].
The reason for considering decentralization in anti-poverty programs is that it might have positive
eects on economic development and growth [Oates (1993)]. Decentralization brings the govern-
ment closer to the people so that local ocials are better informed on the local needs, and are thus
more capable to provide the optimal mix of local policies. This increase in eciency contributes
to economic growth [Oates (1972)]. The eciency argument also plays a role in the case of aid
assignment. If local bureaucrats have better information of local needs, they might also have an
advantage in selecting the most eective development projects to be nanced by foreign aid. Thus,
decentralization should increase aid eectiveness.
There are also arguments for a negative impact of decentralization on aid eectiveness, e.g. coor-
dination problems, excessive regulation, administrative costs, and local capture. For example with
the capture of local governments, there is a tendency for the local government to provide exces-
sive services to the local elite at the expense of the general public [Bardhan (2002), Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2006)]. Decentralization might therefore increase corruption and cronyism [Lessmann
and Markwardt (2008)]. If we transfer this nding to the case of aid assignment in developing
countries, it means that aid is spent less eectively in decentralized countries in comparison to
centralized countries.
In light of these opposing arguments, the aim of our paper is to investigate aid eectiveness subject
to the federal government structure in target countries. Table 1 provides data showing considerable
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of aid in GDP, and their economic development. For instance, countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean have, on average, a low degree of expenditure decentralization (14.0 %), while countries
in Europe and Central Asia have a higher degree of decentralization (24.3 %). Even though both
regions have received a similar amount of foreign aid in relation to GDP, Latin American countries
have grown much faster.
Table 1: Stylized facts: Aid, Growth and Decentralization around the world
Sub-Saharan Latin America East Asia Middle East Europe & Developed
Africa & the Caribbean & Pacica & North Afrikab Central Asiac OECDd
expenditure
decentralization
(1970-1997) 13.1 % 14.0 % 21.2 % 4.6 % 24.3 % 29.6 %
ODA/GDP
(1966-1997) 8.3 % 1.9 % 4.5 % 4.7 % 1.7 % {
annual real
GDP growth
(1966-1997) 2.81 % 3.75 % 5.99 % 4.23 % 2.02 % 2.95 %
per capita
growth
(1966-1997) -0.14 % 1.52 % 3.96 % 1.47 % 1.11 % 2.25 %
Notes: a=compound annual growth rate without Mongolia; b=compound annual growth rate without Bahrein;
c=compound annual growth rate 1982-1997 without Russia and Czech Republic; d=compound annual growth
rate 1970-1997. The regional classication of countries follows World Bank denitions.
Our brief theoretical considerations and the presented data suggest that the eectiveness of foreign
aid may depend on the devolution of powers. To answer this research question, we estimate a
commonly-used growth model based on a panel data set of 60 developing countries, covering the
period 1966-1997. In contrast to previous studies, we don't focus on the interaction between aid
and `good policy'. Instead of that we focus on relationship between aid and decentralization on
growth. Our main nding is that foreign aid has no signicant impact on growth, decentralization
has a signicant positive impact on growth, and that aid is more eective in centralized countries.
Furthermore, we show that decentralized countries receive more development assistance, although
our results cast doubt on the appropriateness of decentralization as part of development programs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview of the
theoretical arguments concerning the relationship between aid, growth, and the role of decentrali-
zation. Section 3 surveys the existing empirical studies on the aid-growth relationship, as well as
the literature on growth and decentralization. In section 4 we conduct our econometric analysis.
Finally, we sum up our ndings and conclusions in section 5.
32 The Theoretical Link between Growth, Aid, and Decen-
tralization
The theoretical justication for foreign aid is based on three classes of so-called `gap models.'
The well-known Harrod-Domar growth model assumes an excess supply of labor in developing
countries, decreasing the productivity of capital. Foreign aid helps to increase domestic savings or
directly increase productivity of capital-promoting economic growth [Domar (1946)]. In Chenery
and Strout's dual gap model, foreign aid promotes development by adding to domestic savings and
to foreign exchange availability [Chenery and Strout (1966)]. Aid payments help to either close
the gap between savings and investment, or the gap between export and import, which occur in
developing countries because of limited resources. In addition to the savings and investment gap,
Bacha (1990) asserts that developing countries' governments have weak revenue-raising capacities,
causing a third scal gap. Foreign aid may close this gap and thus stimulating investments and
economic growth.
Friedman (1958) and Bauer (1972) question these positive eects of aid. They argue that foreign
aid hampers economic growth because it will strengthen the power of predatory governments and
thus undermine the emergence of a private sector. Other arguments against a positive eect of aid
are related to its amount and nature. For example, aid is spent because people in rich countries
have pity on those in poorer countries because famine, war, eviction, and natural disasters.1 These
donations help developing countries to push their economy back to their long-run steady state
growth path, but not necessarily beyond that. Other examples for ineective aid include foreign
assistance motivated by geostrategic and political reasons. During the Cold War, western countries,
as well as communist Warsaw Pact countries, tried to inuence the political elite in developing
countries, using foreign aid payments to implement their respective ideologies [Alesina and Dollar
(2000) and Wood (2005)]. These aid payments often ended in incumbents' pockets and were hardly
able to promote economic growth [Alesina and Weder (2002)]. Nowadays, we can still observe such
patterns by donor states. For example, Nigeria receives the largest amount of ODA (debt reliefs)
in the world with 10.8 billion U.S. dollars (2007), and it is not farfetched to believe that the recent
rise in oil prices and corresponding Nigerian oil deposits have played an important role in this
context. As this brief discussion shows, aid might have a positive impact on economic development
if donors and/or receivers are benevolent, but aid can also be an obstacle for growth if political or
personal interests are involved.
Both donor countries and international development agencies consider decentralization as an im-
portant element in their anti-poverty programs. The main argument in favor of decentralization
is that the transfer of powers to sub-national governments increases public sector eciency, thus
promoting economic development [Oates (1993)]. Decentralized authorities are much better in-
formed regarding local needs, and can provide the economically-ecient quantity and quality of
local public goods. Especially in the case of a federation with heterogeneous regions, decentralized
1 For example, Ouattara and Strobl (2008) show that, in general, food aid has no impact on growth.
4ocials are in a better position to meet local demands [Oates (1972)]. Another argument in favor
of scal decentralization is the role of local governments in preserving markets [Weingast (1995)].
The idea is that the government acts as monopolist and has the power to exploit the private sector
[Shleifer and Vishny (1993)]. In a decentralized setting, local governments compete on mobile
factors. This scal and institutional competition limits the government's ability to extract rents,
enhancing economic eciency and thus economic growth.
Following these arguments, foreign aid and decentralization may contribute to economic deve-
lopment separately. The question is whether this result is maintained when we combine both
instruments. The eciency argument above can also be made in this context. Local governments
are better informed regarding local demands and are thus able to allocate aid in the most use-
ful projects. If foreign aid is aimed at overcoming the shortness of local public goods - such as
infrastructure, schools, or health care - then decentralization should increase eciency of public
services and thus aid eectiveness. Also, the competition argument is relevant in light of the limi-
ted amount of aid available in developing countries. Sub-national jurisdictions have an incentive
to perform well in exchange for aid payments, thus increasing aid eectiveness. From this point of
view, decentralization should increase aid eectiveness.
However, several observers dismiss the positive eects of decentralization for developing countries.
Swaroopa et al. (2000) analyze the fungibility of aid in federal systems and nd that aid merely
substitutes for spending that the government would have undertaken anyway. Moreover, aid re-
ceived by sub-national governments decreases central government transfers in a similar amount.
From a political economy perspective, Prud'homme (1995) argues that in decentralized countries
there are more opportunities for corruption at the local level because local politicians and bureau-
crats are more likely to be subject to the pressing demands of local interest groups. In addition,
local decision makers usually possess more discretionary powers than national ocials, increasing
the possible negative eects of decentralization. In the same vein, Tanzi (1996) argues that local
ocials live closer to the citizens, and this contiguity leads to a higher impact by local interest
groups on local policy outcomes. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) provide a formal analytical
framework to investigate the eects of decentralization on public service provision in developing
countries considering the capture of local governments. With local capture, with regard to the elite
receiving a larger weight in the local government's welfare function, there is a tendency for the
local government to provide excessive services to the local elite at the expense of the non-elite [see
also Bardhan (2002)].2 This problem might also occur if local bureaucrats decide on the allocation
of foreign aid to local development projects. Therefore, aid might be less eective in decentralized
countries due to corruption and cronyism.
The quality of bureaucrats is also an important factor for the relationship between aid, growth,
and decentralization. Prud'homme (1995) and Tanzi (1996) argue that central government bureau-
cracies are likely to attract more qualied people because they oer better career opportunities
and higher salaries [Brueckner (2000)]. If qualied individuals are abundant, as in most industrial
2 An empirical study by Lessmann and Markwardt (2008) shows that decentralization has indeed a negative impact
on corruption if the monitoring of bureaucrats does not work, which is the case in most aid-receiving countries.
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vernments. In developing countries, however, educational standards are low and qualied human
capital is scarce. Therefore, under decentralization sub-national government, ocials entrusted
with aid disposition may be less qualied for this task than central bureaucrats in reducing aid
eectiveness. As the discussion in this section shows, our hypothesis that aid eectiveness depends
on the federal government structure is well-grounded in the theoretical literature.
3 A Survey of Aid-Growth and Decentralization-Growth
Studies
Since the 1970s, the impact of foreign aid on growth has been studied extensively. Our literature
survey is based on 29 studies published in high-ranking journals between 1972 and 2008.3 Table
A.6 in the appendix summarizes all these studies with respect to the data, methodology, estimation
approach, and main results. We briey discuss some of the most inuential contributions.
Papanek (1973) was the rst study to apply a regression analysis to cross-country data. He found
a positive and signicant relationship between foreign aid and growth. In the subsequent 20 years,
several studies were carried out supporting these ndings [e.g., Dowling and Hiemenz (1982) and
Levy (1988)] or nding no signicant relationship between aid and growth [e.g., Voivodas (1973)
and Mosley et al. (1987)].
Boone (1996) was the rst study to analyze panel data of a wide range of countries. In contrast
to most of the existing studies, Boone used indicators for human development to evaluate aid
eectiveness, nding no signicant eect. He concludes that most aid goes to consumption, but
that higher consumption did not benet the poor. Svensson (1999) was the rst who considered the
interaction of aid and policy variables, which has become a commonly-used concept to evaluate aid
eectiveness, which we have adopted in our empirical analysis. Svensson found a weak signicant
negative impact of aid on growth, but a positive and signicant eect in democracies.
The most inuential study on the relationship between aid and growth was carried out by Burnside
and Dollar (2000).4 They analyzed the impact of foreign aid on growth considering the policy
environment in aid-receiving countries. The main idea is that aid will be more eective if it is
accompanied by a `good policy'. They nd that aid alone has no signicant impact on growth, but
has a positive eect in a `good policy' environment. Thus, Burnside and Dollar conclude that aid
is eective in developing countries "with good scal, monetary and trade policies" [Burnside and
Dollar (2000), p. 847].
Numerous studies have been published since 2000 which reinvestigate the ndings of Burnside
and Dollar (2000) by extending or rearranging the data set, using alternative measures for `good
policy', and by using more sophisticated estimation procedures. Hansen and Tarp (2000), Hansen
3 For a comprehensive survey see McGillivray et al. (2006).
4 This article has been cited 227 times in journals of the social science citation index (January 2009).
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growth, but no evidence for a positive impact of `good policy' on aid eectiveness. Moreover, they
nd evidence for diminishing returns to aid. Easterly (2003) and Easterly et al. (2004) criticize the
results of Burnside and Dollar, showing that their results depend on the underlying measurement
concept of `good policy', the denition of aid, the periods considered, the adjustment for outliers,
and the underlying data. Burnside and Dollar (2004a, 2004b) reply to these criticisms showing
again that aid has a positive impact on growth in a `good policy' environment. Their results are
supported by Alvi et al. (2008), who applied a semiparametric estimation approach to a similar
data set. Recent studies by Roodman (2007) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008) show, that this
research question remains unanswered.
The literature published after this debate has begun to focus on issues other than `good policy' that
might impact aid eectiveness. Islam (2005), for example, focuses on political stability dened by
assassinations, coups d' etats, revolutions, riots, and strikes, showing that aid promotes growth only
in a politically-stable environment. Further, Economides et al. (2008) investigates the relationship
between aid, growth, and rent-seeking activities. They nd a signicant positive eect of aid on
growth, which is mitigated by an endogenous increase in rent-seeking activities, triggered by the
very same rise in aid.
Our empirical study continues from this point, and it sheds some more light on the conditions
under which aid promotes growth. Our focus is on the federal structure of target countries, since
aid might be more or less eective in decentralized countries. There is a limited number of stu-
dies investigating the relationship between decentralization and economic growth, but none have
considered the interdependency with aid eectiveness. Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Woller and
Phillips (1998) provided the rst cross-country studies. While the former found a signicant nega-
tive impact of decentralization on growth in developing countries, the latter found no signicant
relationship. These seemingly contradictory results are probably due to dierent measurement
concepts for decentralization. More recently, Iimi (2005) studied a set of developed and developing
countries, nding a positive impact of decentralization on growth, while Yilmaz (2000), Thieen
(2003), and Thornton (2007) focused on highly developed countries, also nding a weak positive
relationship or no signicant eects. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) analyze the impact of
decentralization on growth in developing countries. They nd that it depends on the institutio-
nal framework, that is the strength of national political parties and the degree of administrative
subordination, whether the eect of decentralization is positive or negative. In the literature on
decentralization and growth, there is a special focus on China and Chinese provinces. The rst
study of China by Zhang and Zou (1998) found a negative impact of decentralization on regio-
nal GDP growth, while Lin and Liu (2000) found a signicant positive impact. Jin et al. (2005)
analyzed the impact of local revenue autonomy on the development of the non-state sector and
found a positive relationship. In all, the majority of studies found decentralization to have growth-
enhancing eects, although this nding is very sensitive to the underlying measurement concepts
of decentralization and the particular country sample.
74 Empirical analysis
The theoretical discussion of section 2 suggests that the degree of decentralization in aid-receiving
countries may determine aid eectiveness. Following Oates' decentralization theorem aid should be
more eective in decentralized countries and therefore stimulate more growth. At the same time,
decentralization may have reverse eects, e.g., through increased corruption and cronyism, or poor
bureaucratic quality at the local government level. In light of these opposing arguments, this section
studies the relationship between aid and growth by considering the degree of decentralization in
aid-receiving countries. Our empirical work attempts to answer two key questions: (1) Is the
eect of aid on growth conditional on the federal structure of aid-receiving countries? (2) Do
governments in donor countries and in international development agencies allocate aid eectively
with respect to our ndings in question (1)? After introducing the econometric model and the
underlying data, we rst test whether the `good policy' hypothesis applies for our data set. Using
these results as a benchmark, we estimate our model considering the interdependency between aid
and decentralization. Finally, we test whether aid is allocated eectively in terms of our results,
and we carry out several robustness checks.
4.1 Econometric specication
We parse our research questions by estimating variants of a time eects panel data model. Our
basic growth regression for N countries and T time periods, where countries are indexed by i and
time by t, has the following form:
^ yi;t = yi;t +
k X
j=1
jcontrolj;i;t + 1aidi;t + 2deci;t + 3(aidi;t  deci;t) + t + i;t; (1)
Here ^ yi;t is real per capita GDP growth rate, yi;t is the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP,
controlj;i;t are k exogenous control variables aecting growth, aidi;t is aid receipts relative to GDP,
deci;t is the degree of scal or political decentralization, t are time eects, and i;t is a random
error term.
The growth equation 1 is similar to specications often used in the literature on aid eectiveness
and the literature on growth in developing countries. The penultimate column of table A.6 in the
appendix shows the main estimation equations of all empirical studies considered in our literature
survey.
As is standard in this literature, we capture convergence eects by allowing growth during period t
to depend on yi;t, the logarithm of real per capita GDP at the beginning of the period. Our growth
equation also considers k exogenous control variables, which we assume to be independent from
aid and growth. These variables are necessary to capture institutional and political factors that
might aect growth and also help us to avoid an omitted variable bias on our coecients. One of
these controls is ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which the literature has shown to be correlated
with poor growth performance. Another control is the number of assassinations, which captures
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also control for the institutional quality. Moreover, we consider ination in our growth regressions,
which serves as a proxy for macroeconomic stability. Our measures of ethnic fractionalization and
institutional quality are time-invariant. Together with regional dummies for Sub-Saharan countries
and East Asia, these controls capture time-invariant heterogeneities. In section 2, we argued that
the eectiveness of foreign aid depends on decentralization, so our growth equation includes not
only measures of aid and decentralization, but also their interactions.
After investigating the role of decentralization in the relationship between foreign aid and growth,
we are interested to know if foreign aid is allocated correctly with respect to our ndings. As
mentioned above, developing agencies consider decentralization as a part of their poverty-reduction
programs. Thus, it is straightforward to expect that decentralized countries receive more foreign
assistance. Assuming that we nd aid being more eective in centralized countries, the development
strategy may have to be reconsidered. To examine the past allocation of aid, we estimate a time
eects panel data model:
aidi;t = 'aidi;t 1 + yi;t +
m X
j=1
jcontrolj;i;t + 1policyi;t + 2deci;t + t + i;t; (2)
where controlj;i;t are m exogenous control variables that might aect aid receipts, and pi;t is a
policy index similar to Burnside and Dollar (2000) [see section 4.3 for details].
Since decisions on aid payments by donor countries often inuence aid ow to recipients over more
than one period, we consider a lagged value of aid on the right hand side of the equation. Countries
receiving a certain amount of aid in one period probably received a similar amount of aid in the
following. Moreover, we control for the initial GDP at the beginning of each period, the population
size, infant mortality, and regional dummies.
The equations are estimated using a panel across eight four-year periods from 1966 through 1997.
Our data set consists of 60 developing countries. The bottleneck for our research is the availability
of government nance data, which is required to calculate decentralization measures. This restricts
our sample to 60 countries. Before we test the impact of scal decentralization on aid eectiveness,
we rst test the `good policy' hypothesis for our sample, and then use these results as benchmark.
The number of periods and countries in our sample implies a maximum of 480 observations. Since
we have only 366 observations in our regressions, our panel is unbalanced.
4.2 The Data
The GDP and aid data are from Worldbank (2006); the number of assassinations, the budget
surplus, and the institutional quality index come from the Easterly et al. (2004) data set. Alesina
et al. (2003) provide the data for ethnolinguistic fractionalization; the data on economic openness,
ination, population size, and infant mortality are from Worldbank (2006).5
5 See Table A.1 in the appendix for details. Table A.2 provides summary statistics of all considered variables.
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In line with the literature, we use the real GDP per capita growth rate as measure of economic
development. As measures for foreign assistance, two variables have often been used: ocial
development assistance (ODA) and eective development assistance (EDA), each as share of GDP.
The main dierence between EDA and ODA is that EDA is the sum of grants and the grant
equivalents of ocial loans, whereas ODA includes both the direct grants and concessional loans
for which the grant component is above 25%. Which measure to use, and whether it should be
used in current or constant U.S. dollars, is widely discussed in the literature [see, e.g., Chang
et al. (1998)]. In the end, it should not make any dierence in our context since Dalgaard and
Hansen (2001) have shown that the Pearson correlation between nominal ODA/GDP and nominal
EDA/GDP is 0.98, and the correlation between nominal ODA/GDP and real EDA/GDP is 0.95
[see also Roodman (2007)]. We decided to use the nominal ODA/GDP ratio, providing us with
one additional four-year period in our panel.
The last variable to be discussed in detail is our decentralization index. Several measurement
concepts are used in the literature [see, e.g., Treisman (2002) and Rodden (2004)]. Decentraliza-
tion is often viewed as the devolution of authority towards sub-national governments, with total
government authority over society and economy perceived as xed. Attempts to dene and measure
decentralization have focused on scal authority (rather than political authority). In our context,
we are interested in both issues: Is aid spent on the central or local level? Do central or local go-
vernments decide on aid assignment to particular projects? The rst issue can be approximated by
using the degree of expenditure decentralization, which relates expenditures of sub-national govern-
ments (state + local) to total government expenditures. The IMF Government Finance Statistics
provides the underlying data. The degree of expenditure decentralization has often been used in
the literature, particularly the literature on growth and decentralization, discussed in section 3.
However, the degree of expenditure decentralization is unable to reect the political dimension of
the decision-making process. For this purpose, we refer to decentralization measures provided by
Treisman (2002) and Fan et al. (2009). Since it is very dicult to create measures for political
processes, Treisman has created several dummy variables based on the constitutions of countries. A
sub-national legislature is said to have `residual authority' if the constitution assigns the exclusive
right to legislate on issues that are not specically assigned to one level of government. Another
measure captures the `autonomy' of a sub-national legislature regarding a given question, and
whether the constitution reserves exclusive decision-making power on that question. From these
two dummy variables, Treisman creates a third variable which captures whether sub-national
governments have `residual authority and/or autonomy'. We use all three dummy variables to test
the impact of political decentralization on the aid-growth nexus.6
6 Our measures of scal and political decentralization indeed reect dierent kinds of decentralization, as the
correlation coecients show (t-values in parenthesis): expenditure decentralization { residual authority: 0.17
(3.93); expenditure decentralization { autonomy: 0.16 (3.66), expenditure decentralization - residual authority
and/or autonomy: 0.03 (0.81); residual authority { autonomy: 0.67 (21.08); residual authority { residual authority
and/or autonomy: 0.76 (27.15); autonomy { residual authority and/or autonomy: 0.90 (48.28).
104.3 Benchmark Regressions: The `Good Policy' Hypothesis
Since our data set diers slightly from those of other authors, we rst investigate whether the `good
policy' hypothesis also holds for our sample, then using these results as a benchmark. The `good
policy' index policyi;t is constructed from an OLS growth regression with no aid terms [compare
Burnside and Dollar (2000) or Easterly et al. (2004)]:
^ yi;t = yi;t +
k X
j=1
jcontrolj;i;t + 1budgeti;t + 2(1 + inf i;t) + 3openi;t + t + i;t; (3)
where budgeti;t is the budget surplus, inf i;t is the ination rate, and openi;t reects economic
openness measured by the ratio between total trade (exports + imports) and GDP. Table A.3 in
the appendix provides the estimation results. The policy index is formed by using the regression
coecients:
policy = 0:064 + 0:225  budget   0:066  log(1 + inf )   0:0003  open: (4)
In this way we let the growth regression determine the relative importance of the dierent policies
in our index. The advantage of this procedure is that we capture those macroeconomic country
characteristics in just one variable, which we can later use to analyze aid eectiveness. Unfortu-
nately, this approach is problematic, since we are dealing with a generated regressor [Wooldridge
(2002)]. We dismiss these problems for a better comparability of our benchmark results.
This policy index is now used in a growth regression to investigate whether aid's impact on growth
depends on those `good policies' (policyi;t). The basic estimation equation looks similar to equation
(1), discussed above:
^ yi;t = yi;t +
k X
j=1
jcontrolj;i;t + 1aidi;t + 2policyi;t + 3(aidi;t  policyi;t) + t + i;t: (5)
In addition to the control variables, our regressions include foreign aid (aidi;t), the policy index
(policyi;t), and the interaction of aid and the policy index (aidi;t  policyi;t). Since we use an
interaction term of two continuous variables, the coecients of our variables have to be interpreted
with caution. Without interaction of variables, each coecient reects the marginal impact of the
corresponding independent variable on the dependent variable. With the interaction of variables,
the coecient 1 (2) only captures the eect of aid (policy) on growth when policy (aid) is zero.
Now the marginal impact of aid on growth depends on the sign and magnitude of the coecient
of aid (1), and the sign and magnitude of the coecient of our interaction variable (3).7 Due
to possible heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, we calculate panel corrected standard errors
(PCSE) following Beck and Katz (1995). Table 2 presents OLS estimation results for alternative
specications of growth equation (5).
7 For a detailed explanation, see section 4.4.
11Table 2: Benchmark results
Dependent variable: real GDP growth
(1) (2) (3)
initial GDP 0.002 0.001 -0.003
(0.11) (0.06) (-0.17)
ethnic fractionalization -0.053* -0.053* -0.055*
(-1.85) (-1.84) (-1.90)
assassinations -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.026***
(-2.96) (-2.95) (-2.73)
ethnic  assassinations 0.047** 0.047** 0.043**
(2.43) (2.41) (2.16)
institutional quality 0.009** 0.009** 0.009**
(2.36) (2.35) (2.33)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.026 -0.025 -0.025
(-1.14) (-1.13) (-1.13)
East-Asia 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.114***
(10.25) (10.11) (9.36)
policy index 0.997*** 1.038*** 1.146***
(5.34) (5.67) (3.84)





aid  policy index -0.637 -4.56
(-0.31) (-0.55)
(aid)
2  policy index 13.64
(0.64)
period dummies yes yes yes
obs. 334 (60) 334 (60) 334 (60)
adj.-R
2 0.33 0.32 0.32
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Signicance levels are reported as
follows: * for a 90%-signicance-level, ** for 95% and *** for more than 99%.
In Table 2 column (1) we present estimation results without the interaction of aid and the policy
index; in column (2) we added the interaction term; and in column (3) we added an interaction
term of aid squared and policy to investigate whether diminishing or increasing returns to aid
exists.
Interestingly, we were unable to identify any signicant relationship between aid and growth for
our sample of countries. The policy index has the expected signicant positive eect on growth in
the rst specication. The `good policy' hypothesis would now require a signicant marginal eect
of aid on growth conditional on the policy index. Although the interaction term in specication
2 and 3 is insignicant, this does not necessarily mean that no such relationship exists. For this
purpose, we have to calculate the marginal eects, which are indeed insignicant for all relevant
values of the policy variable. We therefore conclude that the `good policy' hypothesis does not hold
for our sample of countries, which is in line with Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Easterly (2003),
Easterly et al. (2004) among others.
Let us now turn to the interpretation of our control variables. The initial per capita GDP as
control for the convergence hypothesis is insignicant at conventional condence levels, consistent
with most studies on aid and growth [see, e.g., Burnside and Dollar (2000), Dalgaard and Hansen
(2001), and Easterly et al. (2004)]. Countries with a high degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization
face slower growth rates, if there are no riots and/or wars (assassinations = 0). In the case of
12assassinations, we have to calculate the marginal eects on growth again [see gure 3 in the
appendix]. It turns out that assassinations have a signicant negative eect on growth in countries
with a low degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Our variable for institutional quality has a
signicant positive impact on growth; the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy is insignicant, while the
East Asia dummy is positive and highly signicant. Due to space limitations, we do not report
the period dummies. Our regressions explain about 32% of the variance of the dependent variable,
which is consistent with the results of existing studies.
4.4 Main Estimation Results: Aid, Growth and Devolution
In this section, we test our main hypothesis that the relationship between foreign aid and growth is
conditional on the degree of decentralization. Our discussion of the relevant theoretical literature
in section 2 has shown that both scal and political decentralization may play a role in the aid-
growth nexus. To investigate this research question, we estimate variants of our empirical growth
equation (1). First, we turn to test the impact of scal decentralization, as reected by the degree
of expenditure decentralization, on the aid-growth relationship; second, we focus on measures of
political decentralization.
Fiscal Decentralization
Our measure of scal decentralization is the commonly-used degree of expenditure decentralization,
which relates expenditures at the state and local government level to total government expendi-
tures. The IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) includes budgetary data on 60 aid-receiving
countries. The problem of the IMF data is that it does not cover our whole observation period,
which starts in 1966. The rst entries in the GFS are for 1970, and there are several missing values.
Therefore, we build the average of decentralization measures between the years 1970 and 1997. We
lose the time series properties of the decentralization data, but we are able to substantially extend
the number of observations in our estimations. At the end of this section, we provide a robustness
test on this issue.
To address whether the eectiveness of aid depends on the degree of decentralization, we include two
interactive terms { aid  expenditure decentralization and (aid)2  expenditure decentralization
{ into our regression. Table 3 presents our main results. In column (1) we show OLS estimations
without interaction of aid and the degree of expenditure decentralization; in column (2) we added
the interaction term; and in column (3) we added an interaction term of aid squared and the degree
of expenditure decentralization. In the following three columns, we repeat these estimations by
applying the two-stage-least-squares (TSLS) estimation procedure instrumented for foreign aid by
its one-period (four-year averaged) lagged values, as donor countries might respond to negative
growth shocks by providing more assistance. In this case, aid is inuenced by growth, and we
would have an endogeneity bias.
13Table 3: Main Results, Fiscal Decentralization
Dependent variable: real GDP growth
OLS TSLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
initial GDP -0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.011 0.013 -0.020
(-0.13) (0.07) (-0.02) (0.68) (0.86) (-0.45)
ethnic fractionalization -0.067** -0.061** -0.064** -0.071** -0.066** -0.109**
(-2.26) (-2.17) (-2.21) (-2.33) (-2.22) (-2.05)
assassinations -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.023
(-2.83) (-3.28) (-3.11) (-3.45) (-3.69) (-1.38)
ethnic  assassinations 0.046** 0.047** 0.046** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.034
(2.28) (2.42) (2.31) (2.79) (2.85) (1.02)
institutional quality 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.010
(1.37) (0.53) (0.68) (1.17) (0.50) (1.06)
log(1+ination) -0.073*** -0.078*** -0.077*** -0.069*** -0.075*** -0.076***
(-5.75) (-5.83) (-5.87) (-5.46) (-5.41) (-4.90)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.012 -0.006 -0.007 -0.018 -0.012 -0.026
(-0.59) (-0.34) (-0.39) (-0.86) (-0.59) (-1.10)
East-Asia 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.120*** 0.118*** 0.093***
(9.36) (10.73) (10.18) (9.38) (10.13) (2.84)
expenditure decentralization 0.001* 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** -0.001
(1.90) (5.08) (3.96) (2.36) (4.84) (-0.26)
aid -0.180 0.178 0.037 0.093 0.377 -2.60




aid  decentralization -0.035*** -0.021 -0.031*** 0.174
(-6.40) (-1.00) (-3.94) (0.90)
(aid)
2  decentralization -0.096 -1.313
(-0.72) (-1.07)
period dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs. 366 (60) 366 (60) 366 (60) 354 (60) 354 (60) 354 (60)
adj.-R
2 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.34 0.15
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a 90%-signicance-level,
** for 95% and *** for more than 99%.
The estimation without the interaction of aid and decentralization shows that the degree of expen-
diture decentralization is positively associated with economic growth for our sample of developing
countries, which is consistent with earlier ndings in the literature on decentralization and growth
[see section 3]. Importantly, foreign aid has no signicant growth eects. Since we are primarily
interested in the impact of scal decentralization on aid eectiveness, we focus on the specication
using the interaction term. Column (2) shows that the coecient of our decentralization measure
is signicant positive, the coecient of aid is insignicant, and the coecient of the interaction
term is signicant negative. However, we are not particularly interested in the individual statistical
signicance of either of these terms. Instead, we want to know their joint signicance or, more
correctly, the marginal eect of aid on growth.8 The marginal eect can be calculated using 1
and 3 given the degree of decentralization [see also equation 1]:
@^ y
@aid
= 1 + 3  dec (6)
Our interaction model asserts that the eect of a change in aid on growth depends on the value
of the conditioning variable decentralization. While it is possible to calculate the marginal eect
8 For an excellent overview on does and don'ts in interaction models see Brambor et al. (2006).
14using equation 6 and the results obtained in Table 3, it is not possible to do the same for the
standard errors. The standard error of interest is:
^  @^ y
@aid =
p
var(1) + dec2  var(3) + 2  dec  cov(13) (7)
The standard errors are used to calculate the condence band around the marginal eects. To
help the reader see more precisely how the marginal eect of aid on growth varies by the degree of
decentralization in developing countries, this marginal eect is plotted in Figure 1. The gure also
includes condence bands for 1 and 10 percent signicance levels. The cuto value of decentrali-
zation is the value of decentralization for which @(growth)=@(aid) = 0 is 5.08 in the fully specied
regression [column (2)]. This implies that { at best { for only a quarter of the countries in the
sample, increased aid is associated with higher growth. For countries close to the cuto value, the
eect of aid on growth is small, while the negative growth impact of aid for the most decentralized
countries in the sample is fairly high. The marginal eect is statistically dierent from zero, with
more than 90 percent (99 percent) condence with a degree of expenditure decentralization excee-
ding roughly 12 percent (17 percent). In other words, the impact of aid on growth is signicantly
negative for nearly 40 percent of countries in our sample. Our results imply that foreign aid is less
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Figure 1: Marginal eect of aid on growth: scal decentralization
The results of Table 3 columns (4)-(6) show that our results remain widely unchanged when we
apply the TSLS estimation procedure. In particular, the coecients of the degree of expenditure
decentralization, the aid ratio, and the interaction term are similar in magnitude and signicance
15across the OLS and TSLS regressions. The cuto-value for which the marginal impact of aid on
growth becomes zero is 12.2. The eects of all other variables are unaected by using TSLS.
Political Decentralization
As discussed above, the degree of expenditure decentralization is unable to reect the political
dimension of the devolution of powers. Nevertheless, it is interesting to identify the level of go-
vernment on which decisions regarding aid appropriation are made. For this purpose, we use the
decentralization measures residual authority, autonomy, and residual authority and/or autonomy
developed by Treisman (2002). We admit that this is just an approximation for what we really
desire to measure in this context. In fact, there exists no reliable cross-country information on
the process of appropriation decisions on aid in all considered aid-receiving countries. What we
have tested here is whether aid is more or less eective in countries with sub-national government
authorities and autonomy, respectively.
The results of OLS estimations of equation (1) considering measures of political decentralization
are presented in Table 4. Since Treisman's decentralization measures are only available for a
smaller number of countries than our measure of scal decentralization, we lose 14 countries and
100 observations in our data set. However, the bias in observations is only a minor problem, since
estimations using the degree of expenditure decentralization based on the same smaller sample
return similar results to those of Table 3.9
9 OLS estimations return the following coecients: expenditure decentralization 0.003 (t-value: 5.11); aid 0.177
(0.73); aid  expenditure decentralization -0.038 (-5.92). The sample consists of 47 countries with 265 observa-
tions,  R2=0.37. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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Dependent variable: real GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
initial GDP -0.021 -0.032 ** -0.023 * -0.048 *** -0.021 -0.040 ***
(-1.43) (-2.15) (-1.66) (-3.25) (-1.05) (-2.15)
ethnic fractionalization -0.041 -0.032 -0.044 -0.039 -0.045 -0.040
(-1.19) (-0.96) (-1.31) (-1.19) (-1.41) (-1.34)
assassinations -0.007 -0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.006 -0.005
(-0.41) (-0.23) (0.12) (0.26) (-0.37) (-0.30)
ethnic  assassinations 0.000 -0.014 -0.034 -0.047 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (-0.39) (-0.79) (-1.10) (-0.04) (-0.35)
institutional quality 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.36) (0.29) (0.18) (0.47) (0.29) (0.29)
log(1+ination) -0.064 *** -0.064 *** -0.059 *** -0.064 *** -0.062 *** -0.066 ***
(-4.52) (-4.63) (-4.15) (-4.61) (-4.09) (-4.17)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.044 * -0.037 * -0.041 * -0.042 * -0.040 * -0.035
(-1.96) (-1.69) (-1.80) (-1.90) (-1.69) (-1.60)
East-Asia 0.109 *** 0.096 *** 0.109 *** 0.090 *** 0.111 *** 0.097 ***
(5.44) (4.81) (5.40) (4.49) (7.16) (6.80)
aid -0.390 ** -1.917 *** -0.401 ** -2.033 *** -0.390 * -1.90 ***
(-2.54) (-4.76) (-2.58) (-4.93) (-1.83) (-4.55)
(aid)
2 6.554 *** 6.728 *** 6.367 ***
(4.12) (4.17) (3.62)
residual power 0.003 -0.018
(0.13) (-0.78)
aid  residual power -0.118 1.239
(-0.21) (0.78)
(aid)




aid  autonomy -0.374 -3.454
(-0.66) (-1.54)
(aid)
2  autonomy 26.64
(1.55)
residual power + autonomy -0.004 -0.005
(-0.20) (-0.19)
aid  (residual power + autonomy) -0.376 -2.852 *
(-0.96) (-1.89)
(aid)
2  (residual power + autonomy) 21.67 **
(2.09)
period dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 263 (46) 263 (46) 257 (46) 257 (46) 265 (47) 265 (47)
adj.-R
2 0.30 0.35 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.35
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a 90%-signicance-level,
** for 95% and *** for more than 99%.
Table 4 reports six dierent specications of our growth equation. The estimation reported in co-
lumn (1) considers aid, the residual power dummy, and the interactions of aid and residual power.
Column (2) considers an additional interaction term of (aid)2 and residual power. Similar spe-
cications are used in the following columns considering the decentralization measures autonomy
and residual power + autonomy, respectively. As in the case of our regressions with the degree
of expenditure decentralization, we refer to the marginal eects of aid on growth. Figure 2 shows
the results considering residual power and/or autonomy as measure for political decentralization.
Again, the marginal eects of aid on growth are negative in centralized and decentralized countries
alike. The negative eect increases with the degree of political decentralization, which is similar to
the results for scal decentralization. However, the eect is only signicant in cases of more centra-
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Figure 2: Marginal eect of aid on growth: political decentralization
of foreign aid as scal decentralization.
Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Checks
The rst robustness test is to check whether our results are sensitive to single outliers. For this
purpose, we adopt the Hadi (1994) method for identifying and eliminating outliers. The Hadi
method measures the distance of data points from the main body of data, and then iteratively
reduces the sample to exclude distant data points. This procedure identies twelve outliers we
remove from our sample.10 We re-estimate our empirical growth model obtaining similar results
to those presented above.11 In another sample adjustment, we exclude former communist Warsaw
Pact countries, since one might argue that these countries are not comparable to South American
or African countries. This does not change anything in our results.
An important test is to use a time-variant decentralization measure. In our main regressions we
have built a long period average (1970-1997) of the degree of expenditure decentralization, since we
have only a few observations for some countries in our data set. Now we use the original frequency
of the IMF government nance data and re-estimate our empirical model. In doing so, we lose 3
of our 60 countries, and our total number of observations declines from 366 to 188. Nevertheless,
our results are insensitive to these robustness tests, as shown in Table A.4 in the appendix. We
have also checked for the robustness of our results if we use the same sample for our measure of
scal decentralization as in the regressions considering political decentralization. Again, our results
remain robust.
10 The outliers are Albania 1990-1993, Botswana 1974-1977, Congo 1994-1997, Gambia 1986-1989, Jordan 1978-1981,
Senegal 1978-1997, Mongolia 1990-1997, and Zambia 1994-1997.
11 The results are available from the authors upon request.
18A further robustness check is to combine the "good policy" hypothesis and our hypothesis that
decentralization determines aid eectiveness. For this purpose, we include both the policy index
and the degree of expenditure decentralization, as well as their interactions with aid and (aid)2 in
our growth equation. Table A.5 in the appendix presents the main results for the coecients of
interest, conrming our main ndings.
4.5 Aid Allocation
The estimations of our empirical growth model show that aid is less eective { or even harmful {
in decentralized countries. In light of this nding, it is interesting to study whether aid is allocated
eectively. For this purpose, we investigate the determinants of the amount of aid received by
developing countries by estimating equation (2).
Since decisions on the amount of aid spent in a particular country are made for a longer period
of time, we consider a dynamic panel model including a lagged dependent variable on the right
hand side of the equation. The level of aid received in one period probably depends on the level
of aid that was received earlier.12 Moreover, we include the initial GDP per capita as a control
variable since we expect less foreign aid in richer countries. Earlier studies, e.g., Burnside and
Dollar (2000) have shown that the population size is a determinant of aid ow, so we include the
log of population. Since aid might also react to the distress of the poorest people in developing
countries, we consider infant mortality as a control. Furthermore, we add a Sub-Saharan dummy,
a dummy for Central America, and a dummy for those countries that are former French colonies,
in order to capture donors' strategic interests. The most important variables are the policy index
and our dierent measures of scal and political decentralization. The results are presented in
Table 5.
Our regressions show that the amount of aid received by a particular country depends positively on
the level of aid spent during the previous period, which is in line with our predictions. Moreover,
richer and larger countries receive less foreign aid. The distress of poor people reected by infant
mortality has no signicant eect on aid. This is in line with the ndings of Boone (1996). The
policy index has a signicant negative eect, indicating that countries with "good" macroeconomic
policies receive less aid. This may be due to the fact that donors react to the good performance
of countries with a cut in development assistance. Most importantly, all of our decentralization
measures have a signicant positive impact on aid, meaning that more aid is spent in decentralized
countries. This is, however, not ecient in light of our ndings from the growth regressions, which
revealed that decentralization has a negative impact on aid eectiveness.
12 We are aware of the potential problems estimating dynamic panels with OLS, but since we do not include country
xed eects and since we are interested just in the sign of the coecient of our decentralization variable, we avoid
applying more sophisticated estimation procedures.
19Table 5: Aid allocation
Dependent variable: Aid/GDP ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lagged aid/GDP 0.694 *** 0.769 *** 0.770 *** 0.769 ***
(5.47) (5.95) (5.97) (5.97)
initial GDP -0.021 *** -0.015 ** -0.015 ** -0.015 **
(-3.64) (-2.38) (-2.33) (-2.38)
population size -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 ***
(-3.29) (-3.10) (-3.22) (-3.15)
infant mortality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.35) (0.98) (1.05) (1.11)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.006 0.003 0.004 0.003
(-0.89) (0.46) (0.48) (0.39)
Central America 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.03) (-0.38) (-0.39) (-0.35)
Franc Zone 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.50) (-0.53) (-0.58) (-0.54)
policy index -0.156 ** -0.095 ** -0.094 ** -0.090 **
(-2.42) (-2.42) (-2.40) (-2.28)
expenditure decentralization 0.001 *
(1.84)




residual authority and/or autonomy 0.005 **
(2.22)
period dummies yes yes yes yes
obs 251 (59) 179 (45) 176 (45) 180 (46)
adj.-R
2 0.76 0.82 0.82 0.83
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Signicance levels are reported as follows:
* for a 90%-signicance-level, ** for 95% and *** for more than 99%.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The eectiveness of foreign assistance is discussed extensively in scientic and public discussions.
One issue that has been neglected in the empirical literature is the role of the federal structure of
aid-receiving countries. The aim of our paper was to investigate whether aid eectiveness depends
on the devolution of powers in developing countries.
For this purpose, we have estimated the impact of foreign assistance on growth by considering the
interdependency between aid and various decentralization measures. Our estimations are based
on a panel of 60 developing countries covering the period from 1966 to 1997. We found that aid
is less eective { or even harmful { in decentralized countries. Moreover, we investigated whether
foreign assistance is allocated eciently among developing countries, nding that decentralization
has a positive impact on the amount of aid received.
Nevertheless, some additional remarks are necessary. The most important constraint of our cross-
country study is that we do not know much about the factual mechanisms of spending decisions
of aid in developing countries. We can only assume that sub-national governments are involved
in spending decisions in decentralized countries, and that our decentralization measures are good
approximations. However, this is a common problem among cross-country studies of this kind.
Another issue is that there might be dierences between the various aims and sources of foreign
20assistance [see Ouattara and Strobl (2008)]. For instance, it may be easier for a local government to
embezzle money from a general budget, as opposed to technical assistance, which is often directly
supervised by the donor. A detailed study remains an issue for future research.
Another important issue is related to the appropriateness of our development measure. Following
most studies on aid eectiveness, we refer to the growth of real per capita GDP as a measure of
economic development. However, donor countries might be more interested in human development
than economic development. Let us give an example for income data being a poor indicator of
development: Angola is a country that has received up to 1 billion U.S. dollars (2004) in foreign aid
per year. In recent years, the country faces (due to its oil exports) rapid economic growth, reaching
a per capita GDP of nearly 4,000 U.S. dollars in 2007. Nevertheless, the situation of the poor
continues to be unsatisfactory. In terms of aid per capita, Uganda is comparable to Angola, with
both countries receiving about 30 U.S. dollars. However, Uganda has just a tenth of Angolan GDP
per capita, but rst-year infant mortality rates (80 per 1,000 live births) is just half of Angola's,
with a value of 154 [Source: WDI, 2004]. Additionally, in terms of the Human Development Index
(HDI) provided by the United Nations Development Program, Uganda is among the countries
with medium human development (HDI 2005 score: 0.505), while Angola is among the group
of countries with low human development (HDI 2005 score: 0.446). This example shows that
income data { although commonly used as in our study { is not always appropriate in evaluating
aid eectiveness.13 We have therefore experimented with indicators of human development as
a dependent variable. Our results do not contradict our major ndings. The fewer number of
observations limit the robustness and validity in those regressions.
The policy implication of our ndings is straightforward. Several national and international deve-
lopment agencies consider decentralization initiatives as a main part of their anti-poverty programs.
Our study suggests that aid is less eective in decentralized countries. Therefore, it should be ca-
refully considered how both instruments { foreign aid and decentralization { work together.
13 Some studies, e.g., Boone (1996), consider alternative measures for development than income or GDP data. Boone
estimates the aid/GDP ratio on growth of infant mortality, life expectancy, and primary schooling, nding no
signicant relationship with aid.
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aid/GDP Ocial development assistance (ODA) consists of net disbur-
sements of loans and grants made on concessional terms by
ocial agencies of the members of DAC and certain Arab
countries to promote economic development and welfare in
recipient economies listed as developing by DAC. ODA also
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ODA.
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Log of population Log of total population. WDI 2006































0.90 confidence level 0.99 confidence level
Figure 3: Marginal eect of assasinations on growth depending on ethnic fractionalizetion
27Table A.2: Summary statistics
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
real per capita GDP growth 403 0.06 0.13 0.57 -0.37
initial GDP 443 3683.49 2668.69 13586.40 330.37
ethnic fractionalization 480 0.48 0.25 0.93 0.00
assassinations 464 0.38 1.09 11.50 0.00
institutional quality 480 4.88 1.67 8.23 1.60
expenditure decentralization 480 15.73 13.85 50.71 1.53
aid/GDP 409 0.05 0.06 0.41 0.00
budget surplus 394 -0.03 0.04 0.15 -0.31
ination 397 91.19 468.37 6258.12 -1.10
openness 425 57.99 34.26 245.24 4.91






infant mortality 350 66.98 40.27 189.00 5.80
Table A.3: Estimation of policy indicators

























t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
Signicance levels are reported as follows:
* for a 90%-signicance-level, ** for 95%
and *** for more than 99%.
28Table A.4: Robustness check: time-variant decentralization measures
Dependent variable: real GDP growth
(1) (2) (3)
initial GDP -0.031 -0.030 -0.038*
(-1.59) (-1.62) (-1.95)
ethnic fractionalization -0.014 -0.023 -0.026
(-0.33) (-0.54) (-0.61)
assassinations -0.015 -0.019 -0.018
(-0.66) (-0.83) (-0.82)
ethnic  assassinations 0.012 0.016 0.014
(0.26) (0.35) (0.31)
institutional quality 0.009 0.005 0.006
(1.44) (0.83) (0.99)
log(1+ination) -0.059*** -0.067*** -0.068***
(-3.62) (-4.20) (-4.12)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.031 -0.032 -0.032
(-1.15) (-1.34) (-1.21)
East-Asia 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.103***
(4.48) (4.78) (4.40)
expenditure decentralization 0.000 0.002*** 0.001**
(0.51) (3.11) (2.17)





aid  decentralization -0.048*** -0.023
(-5.09) (-0.89)
(aid)
2  decentralization -0.131
(-0.85)
period dummies yes yes yes
obs. 188 (57) 188 (57) 188 (57)
adj.-R
2 0.32 0.38 0.37
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Signicance levels are reported as
follows: * for a 90%-signicance-level, ** for 95% and *** for more than 99%.
Table A.5: Robustness check: interaction terms with squared aid
Dependent variable: real GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
policy index 1.034 *** 1.041 *** 1.018 *** 1.074 *** 1.083 *** 1.393 ***
(5.47) (5.41) (5.63) (5.89) (5.71) (4.97)
expenditure decentralization 0.001 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
(1.52) (3.84) (2.70) (1.51) (3.82) (2.85)
aid 0.017 0.355 * 0.343 0.008 0.346 * 0.660




aid  policy index -0.623 -0.667 -11.41 *
(-0.31) (-0.34) (-1.74)
(aid)
2  policy index 28.51 *
(1.65)
aid  decentralization -0.034 *** -0.010 -0.034 *** -0.012
(-4.24) (-0.39) (-4.23) (-0.47)
(aid)
2  decentralization -0.172 -0.199
(-1.24) (-1.52)
period dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs. 334 (60) 334 (60) 334 (60) 334 (60) 334 (60) 334 (60)
adj.-R
2 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.36
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a 90%-signicance-level,
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